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31 
The Road Not Taken: A Comparison of  
the E.U. and U.S. Insider Trading Prohibitions 
Franklin A. Gevurtz* 
 My introduction to the prohibition on insider trading came as a law 
student in Berkeley in 1976. My notes indicated that the prohibition’s 
scope under U.S. law—we did not think much about foreign law—was 
uncertain. They also pointed out, however, that authority from the Second 
Circuit, particularly the landmark decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,1 
stated that the prohibition reached anyone in possession of material 
nonpublic information. Four years later, the United States Supreme Court, 
in Chiarella v. United States,2 disagreed. Instead, the Supreme Court 
redirected the prohibition on insider trading under United States law into a 
narrower and more complex approach.3 
 One wonders what would have happened if the Supreme Court had 
seen things differently and upheld the Second Circuit’s broad prohibition 
in Chiarella. Comparative law sometimes allows us to explore the impacts 
of different choices regarding legal rules without performing a gedanken 
experiment, searching the multiverse for another Earth on which this 
particular law is different, or watching the movie Sliding Doors as made 
by lawyers.4 Conveniently, the European Union’s adoption of a rule 
similar to the Second Circuit’s pre-Chiarella approach makes this one of 
those times. 
 This essay explores the different paths taken by the U.S. and the E.U. 
with respect to who is subject to the prohibition on insider trading. Part I 
provides an overview of the different approaches taken by U.S. and E.U. 
law. Part II moves from the general to the specific by exploring the 
different outcomes that would occur under U.S. versus E.U. law in several 
high profile cases of recent years. Part III explores a practical implication 
of this divergence by discussing the jurisdictional reach of each regime’s 
prohibition. Finally, Part IV considers what normative lessons we can 
draw from this real world experiment in taking different paths. 
 
*      Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1  401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
2  445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). 
3  See infra Part I.A. 
4  See e.g., SLIDING DOORS (Miramax 1998). 
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I. OVERVIEW OF U.S. AND E.U.  
INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS 
 
A. The U.S. Prohibition 
 
 Early in the 1960s, the U.S. established what appears to be the 
world’s first prohibition of trading on inside information.5 This occurred 
when the Securities and Exchange Commission held that the Cady, 
Roberts brokerage firm violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act,6 as well as Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Commission 
pursuant to that section,7 by selling stock in a corporation after getting 
advance word from a director that the corporation was cutting its 
dividend.8 
 For most of the next two decades, the law remained uncertain 
regarding who was subject to the prohibition on insider trading under U.S. 
law. Cady, Roberts and decisions from the Second Circuit suggested, 
however, that the prohibition could reach anyone in possession of material 
information to which the public lacked access.9 Cady, Roberts explained 
that the obligation to disclose or abstain was not limited to traditional 
categories of insiders (officers, directors and controlling 
shareholders).Rather, the obligation arose from: 1) a relationship that 
allows access, directly or indirectly, to information intended only to be 
available for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of 
anyone, and 2) the unfairness of one party taking advantage of information 
that he or she knows is unavailable to those with whom he or she is 
dealing. Similarly, in condemning the trading on inside information in 
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit explained that the policy of Rule 
10b-5 is to protect the expectation that all investors have relatively equal 
access to material information. To achieve this, the court held that ''anyone 
 
5  E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 
TRANSNAT’L L. 63, 64-65 (2002); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 909 n. 6.   
6  15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
7  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2010). 
8  In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
9  SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 n. 7.  
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in possession of material inside information’’ must disclose the 
information or abstain from trading.10 
 In its 1980 decision in Chiarella, the Supreme Court upended this 
broad view. Chiarella worked for a financial printing company and, based 
upon information obtained through his job, purchased the stock of 
companies targeted for tender offers by the printing company's 
customers.11 He was found guilty of violating the U.S. prohibition on 
insider trading by a jury who, consistent with the approach in the Second 
Circuit, was instructed to convict if they found Chiarella traded on 
material nonpublic information.12 The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, holding that there was no duty to disclose or abstain simply 
because one has material information not publicly available.13 
 If mere possession of material nonpublic information is insufficient to 
create a duty to refrain from buying or selling stock without disclosing 
what one knows, then the inevitable question becomes what, if anything, 
creates such a duty. To answer this question, the Supreme Court in 
Chiarella came up with a rationale that it would later refer to as the 
“traditional” or “classical” theory.14 Under this theory, because corporate 
insiders have a fiduciary relationship with their company’s shareholders, 
they commit fraud if they trade in their own company’s stock without 
disclosing to shareholders material nonpublic information.15 Since 
Chiarella did not work for the companies whose stock he bought—rather 
he worked for a printing company, which, in turn, worked for parties 
planning to buy stock in the companies whose stock he purchased—his 
purchases were not prohibited under classical theory. 
 While the classical theory attempts to rationalize the prohibition’s 
scope, it does not address the factual scenario of Cady, Roberts, in which 
the brokerage firm traded on information coming from an insider, but was 
not itself an insider. The Supreme Court filled this gap in SEC v. Dirks.16 
In Dirks, the Supreme Court reasoned that, since it is illegal for an insider 
 
10  401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
11  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
12  Id. at 236. 
13  Id. at 235. 
14  U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
15  445 U.S. at 228–30. 
16  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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to profit by trading on inside information, it is also illegal for the insider to 
profit by passing on information for another person's use in trading—
thereby accomplishing indirectly what the insider cannot legally do 
directly. Hence, tipping is illegal when a party who cannot legally trade 
receives some personal benefit (such as a payment or even the ability to 
make a gift without spending money) from providing inside information 
for another person’s trading.17 If the recipient of the information (“the 
tippee”) knows or should have known he or she received the information 
illegally, then the tippee is liable for participating in the insider’s breach if 
the tippee trades.18 
 Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court completed the basic edifice for 
the U.S. insider trading prohibition by adopting, in United States v. 
O’Hagan,19 the so-called misappropriation theory as an alternate basis for 
liability. Under the misappropriation theory, parties commit fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security when they trade on non-
public material information obtained in a deceptive manner—most 
commonly through the pretense that the trader could be trusted not to 
abuse information received in confidence (such as through a fiduciary 
relationship).20 
 
B. The E.U. Prohibition 
 
 While various European nations gradually followed the U.S. in 
prohibiting insider trading,21 it was not until 1989 that the E.U. directed all 
member nations to prohibit such activity. The 1989 E.U. directive on 
insider trading22 was not radically different from U.S. law. It required 
member nations to prohibit trading by persons who gain inside 
information through management or board positions with, or by being a 
shareholder of, the issuer, or through their employment, profession or 
 
17  Id. at 659–64. 
18  Id. at 659–60. 
19  521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). 
20  Id. at 651–52. 
21  See Gevurtz, supra note 5. 
22  Council Directive 89/592 of November 13, 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider 
Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30. 
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duties.23 While lacking the overarching reference to fiduciary relationships 
that undergirds the U.S. law, the E.U. categories largely picked up the 
same sort of insiders and parties misappropriating information reached by 
the U.S. prohibition. The principal difference between the 1989 directive 
and U.S. law involved the liability of tippees. The 1989 directive 
prohibited parties from trading if they had received information from 
anyone who could not trade24—thereby adopting the sort of tainted fruit 
approach to tippee liability that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected by 
establishing the personal benefit test in Dirks. 
 In 2003, the E.U. issued a new directive (the Market Abuse Directive, 
or “MAD”).25 While MAD took a very different approach, it is possible to 
miss the significant change in a quick reading. Article 2 of MAD retained 
the same categories of persons prohibited from trading on inside 
information by the 1989 insider trading directive; to which, however, 
MAD also added a new category—those obtaining information from 
criminal activities—thereby adopting the broad misappropriation theory 
advocated by Justice Berger in Chiarella.26 The critical change occurred in 
Article 4. It abandoned the tainted fruit approach to tippee liability found 
in the 1989 directive and replaced it with a broad prohibition reminiscent 
of the Second Circuit’s pre-Chiarella approach. Specifically, Article 4 
directed member nations of the E.U. to prohibit trading on inside 
information when the person trading “possesses inside information while 
that person knows, or ought to have known, that it is inside information.”27 
This provision reduces the impact of Article 2’s categories simply into a 
question of culpable intent: persons in Article 2’s categories need not 
know or should have known that they are trading on inside information, 
whereas anyone outside of the categories must have such knowledge or 
negligence. 
 
23  Id. at art. 2(1). 
24  Id. at art. 4. 
25  Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16. 
26  445 U.S. 222, 241–42 (Berger, C.J. dissenting)(explaining that Section 10(b) should be read 
to prohibit use of information obtained by “unlawful means”). 
27  “Inside information” does not mean that the information came from sources inside the 
corporation. Rather it is information that has not been made public. MAD, supra note 25, at art. 1(1). 
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In 2014, E.U. law changed again. The Market Abuse Regulation 
(“MAR”)28 replaced MAD. A key difference between MAR and MAD is 
their mechanism for implementation: a regulation under E.U. law is 
directly binding law, whereas a directive is an instruction to member 
nations of the European Union as to what their national laws must 
contain.29 While there are other differences between MAD and MAR, 
MAR’s insider trading prohibition, the essential scope of which is defined 
in Article 8, remained the same as MAD’s.30 Hence, European law is 
pretty much what the law in the United States appeared to be before 
Chiarella. 
 
II. THE IMPACT OF THE DIFFERRING U.S. AND E.U. PROHIBITIONS AS 
ILLUSTRATED IN CASES 
 
 To fully appreciate the difference in the U.S. and E.U. approaches, it 
is helpful to compare the results they produce in some relatively recent 
high profile cases. 
 
A. Cuban and Einhorn 
 
 The actions brought by the SEC against Mark Cuban31 and by the 
English Financial Services Authority (FSA) against David Einhorn32 
provide a powerful illustration of the different results under the U.S. and 
E.U. insider trading prohibitions. The conduct in both cases was 
remarkably similar. In both, CEOs contacted a large shareholder (Cuban) 
or the manager of a large institutional shareholder (Einhorn, who managed 
 
28  European Parliament and Council (EU) Regulation 596/2014 on market abuse (market abuse 
regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1. 
29  E.g., RALPH H. FOLSOM, RALPH B. LAKE & VED P. NANDA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER 
MAASTRICHT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET 5 (1996). 
30  Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, art. 8. 
31  See SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
32  Decision Notice, FIN. SERV. AUTHORITY (Jan. 12, 2012) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/decisions/dn-einhorn-greenlight.pdf; Final Notice, FIN. SERV. 
AUTHORITY (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/greenlight-
capital.pdf. 
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the Greenlight fund) to solicit support for planned stock offerings to raise 
money for their corporations. Both Cuban and Einhorn objected to the 
respective offerings, and, when unable to persuade the CEOs to change 
plans, dumped the shareholders’ stock in the corporations prior to 
announcement of the stock offerings.33 In both instances, the corporation’s 
stock sank upon announcement of the offering, meaning that Cuban’s and 
Einhorn’s decisions to trade prior to public announcement of the stock 
offerings avoided substantial losses. 
 The SEC proceeded against Cuban based upon the misappropriation 
theory. Specifically, the SEC alleged that Cuban gained details regarding a 
proposed stock offering from Mamma.com by promising its CEO that 
Cuban would not trade before the offering; then, in breach of the CEO’s 
trust created by this promise, Cuban sold his Mamma.com stock.34 
Ultimately, while an appellate court found the SEC’s complaint alleged a 
viable claim,35 the SEC was unable to convince a jury that Cuban had, in 
fact, promised not to trade.36 As a result, there was no violation of the U.S. 
insider trading prohibition. 
 In the Einhorn case, there was no claim that Einhorn promised not to 
trade. Indeed, when an investment banker acting on behalf of the English 
company, Punch, contacted the Greenlight fund and requested its 
agreement not to trade, Einhorn explicitly refused to have Greenlight 
agree. Nevertheless, the investment banker arranged a call between 
Einhorn and Punch’s CEO with the understanding that Greenlight had not 
agreed to abstain from trading.37 Punch’s CEO discussed with Einhorn the 
possibility of a stock issuance, but held back details unless Greenlight 
agreed not to trade for a week (by which time Punch presumably would 
have publicly announced the stock issuance). Einhorn declined and the 
 
33  Cuban, 620 F.3d at 552; FSA, supra note 32 at 2.  
34  Cuban, 620 F.3d at 552. 
35  Id. at 551. 
36  E.g., Erin Fuchs, Why the SEC Lost its Big Case against Mark Cuban, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17, 
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-mark-cuban-defeated-the-sec-2013-10 (noting additional 
problems for the SEC’s case, including testimony disputing whether information was material and not 
publicly known). 
37  FSA, supra note 32, at ¶ 3.21 
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conversation ended.38 Immediately after the conversation, Einhorn ordered 
Greenlight to sell all its shares in Punch.39 
 It seems clear that Greenlight’s sales would not have violated U.S. 
law. The effort to get Greenlight’s agreement not to trade shows that 
Punch’s CEO was not tipping Einhorn in order to gain some personal 
benefit from passing on the information for trading. Einhorn’s refusal to 
agree not to trade shows that Einhorn did not misappropriate the 
information from Punch through pretense that he could be trusted with the 
information. Nor did Einhorn misappropriate the information from 
Greenlight, since Greenlight, not Einhorn, traded. Further, Einhorn was 
not an officer, director or other fiduciary of Punch. Perhaps one could 
argue that Greenlight’s large shareholdings in Punch (thirteen percent) 
made Greenlight a fiduciary. However, there is no indication that 
Greenlight exercised any control over Punch; indeed, Einhorn expressed 
strong opposition to Punch issuing stock during his conversation with 
Punch’s CEO—advice that the CEO blithely ignored. Moreover, the 
efforts of Punch’s CEO to gain Greenlight’s agreement not to trade and 
refusal to provide further details about the proposed issuance without such 
an agreement suggest that the CEO did not view the conversation as 
providing information to a controlling shareholder in confidence.40 
Showing the difference from U.S. law, in 2012, the FSA imposed a 
£3.6 million fine on Einhorn and Greenlight. Much of the FSA’s 
discussion in the notice of the fine focused on whether the information 
Einhorn received in the phone call (given its lack of details) constituted 
price sensitive (material) non-public information. In evaluating whether 
there was any duty not to trade on inside information, the FSA relied on 
 
38  Id. at Annex 2. 
39  Id. 
40  If Punch had been a company registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Punch’s 
selective disclosures might have violated SEC’s Regulation FD (17 C.F.R. § 243.100-243.103 (2011)); 
but this is not Einhorn or Greenlight’s violation. Alternatively, if Punch had been registered under the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act, Greenlight’s thirteen percent holdings in Punch would have subjected it 
to Section 16(b) of that Act (15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)). This would have required Greenlight to turn over to 
Punch the losses Greenlight avoided by its sale of Punch stock; but only for the number of shares, if 
any, that Greenlight purchased both after becoming a ten percent shareholder and within six months of 
the sale. E.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (purchase that puts 
shareholder over the 10 percent threshold does not count as a purchase or sale within six months under 
Section 16(b)). 
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the fact that Einhorn received the information as a result of his 
employment managing Greenlight.41 This seems strange, since Einhorn did 
not personally trade in violation of any duty to Greenlight; rather he 
ordered Greenlight to trade. In other words, Einhorn violated English law 
because he used information received as part of his job with Greenlight in 
order to carry out his job by using the information on Greenlight’s behalf. 
 For our purposes, however, what is more important than the FSA’s 
theory is what the result would be under MAD and MAR.42 Einhorn was 
aware that he was in possession of material non-public information, which 
makes trading illegal under MAD and MAR.43 And, of course, if the 
undisputed lack of any agreement to abstain from trading would not save 
Einhorn, the lack of such an agreement would not have saved Cuban had 
E.U. rather than U.S. law applied in the Cuban prosecution. 
 
B. Newman 
 
 In United States v. Newman,44 the U.S. prosecuted a pair of hedge 
fund managers who directed their funds to trade based upon advance 
knowledge of NVIDIA and Dell earnings reports obtained through a chain 
of tips. Specifically, insiders at NVIDIA and Dell leaked advance 
information regarding corporate earnings to casual friends—in one case a 
person the insider knew through business school and prior employment 
and in the other case a person the insider knew through attending the same 
church—who, in turn, passed the information through a chain of stock 
analysts until the information reached the defendants.45 
 In a much remarked-upon decision, the Second Circuit reversed the 
defendants’ convictions for illegal insider trading. In part the Second 
Circuit held—the continued validity of which is questionable after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Salman v. United States46—that motivation 
 
41  FSA Final Notice, supra note 32, at ¶ 4.5. 
42  It is not clear why the FSA invoked the bizarre theory it did instead of relying on more 
relevant provisions of English law. 
43  See supra Part I.B. 
44  773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
45  Id. at 439. 
46  137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (rejecting the argument that the tipper, who makes a gift of inside 
information, does not receive enough benefit to make the tip illegal under Dirks unless the tipper 
expects some sort of tangible quid pro quo). 
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by mere casual friendship for the tippee was not a sufficient benefit to 
make the tip illegal under Dirks.47 Of more continuing relevance, the court 
also found there was insufficient proof that the defendants, who received 
the information only after it passed through a chain of tips, knew anything 
about the motivations of the insiders at the beginning of the chain.48 Thus, 
the defendants did not knowingly aid a breach of the insiders’ duty.49 
 Unlike U.S. law, finding illegality in the Newman situation would 
have been pretty straightforward under MAD or MAR. Even under the 
1989 insider trading directive, trading on non-public material information 
traceable to corporate employees would have been illegal without regard 
to any personal benefit to the employees from providing the tip.50 Under 
MAD and MAR, it is not even necessary that the information be traceable 
to corporate insiders. Nor are the motivations of the participants in the 
chain of tipping, much less the defendants’ knowledge of any of this, 
relevant. Instead, the only question in the Newman situation would be 
whether the information was not public and whether the defendants 
realized or should have realized the information was not public.51 Well, 
duh: This was advance knowledge of corporate earnings reports before the 
reports were released to the public. Even if the defendants were unaware 
of the route and motivations by which the information reached them, they 
had to realize the earnings reports were not yet public knowledge. 
 
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE  
U.S. AND E.U. INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
 
 The difference between the U.S. and E.U. insider trading prohibitions 
raises a question of practical consequence: Whose law governs specific 
instances of insider trading in increasingly globalized securities markets?  
 
47  773 F.3d at 452. 
48  Id. at 453–54. 
49    In addition, the government’s case faced another formidable challenge under U.S. law, which 
the court overlooked. Since the defendants were at the end of a chain of tipping between them and the 
insiders, conviction under Dirks presumably should have required some sort of showing of benefit 
from all the intermediate tipping as well as the defendants’ knowledge that all of the intermediate tips 
were illegal. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Overlooked Daisy Chain Problem in Salman, 58 B.C.L. REV. E-
SUPPLEMENT 18 (2017). 
50  See supra note 22. 
51  See supra Part I.B. 
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 In Morrison v. Australia National Bank,52 the Supreme Court sought 
to establish a rule that would provide a simple answer to this question. The 
court held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only reach purchases or sales 
of securities that take place in the U.S.53 Under this approach, whether the 
U.S. versus the E.U. insider trading prohibition applies would depend 
upon whether the trade took place on an exchange in the U.S. or in the 
E.U. 
  The territorial reach of the U.S. insider trading prohibition, however, 
turns out to be not so simple. For one thing, it can be challenging to 
establish the country in which transactions occur when the transactions do 
not take place over an exchange.54 Moreover, Congress subsequently acted 
to overturn Morrison when it comes to government prosecutions for 
violating Section 10(b). Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act grants 
jurisdiction to U.S. courts over government prosecutions of securities 
frauds (which is what insider trading is considered to be55) in which 
conduct constituting a significant step in the furtherance of the fraud 
occurs in the United States or conduct outside the United States has a 
foreseeable substantial effect in the United States.56 How such a test 
applies to cases of insider trading is unclear and presumably depends upon 
the facts of the individual case.57 
 In any event, one also must consider the reach of E.U. law. Unlike 
Morrison, the touchstone for MAR’s application is not where the purchase 
or sale takes place. Rather, the touchstone for MAR’s application is the 
relationship of the transaction to financial instruments—such as stocks, 
bonds, options, derivative contracts or the like58—traded on European 
 
52  561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010). 
53  Id. 
54  See, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 
2012) (adopting a test for locating non-exchange sales). 
55  See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
56  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The reference to “jurisdiction,” rather than to whether the acts 
violate Section 10(b), creates an issue as to whether this provision actually succeeds in overturning 
Morrison for government prosecutions. E.g., Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195 (2011). 
57  See id. at 216-20 (discussing possible insider trading prosecutions pursuant to Dodd-Frank’s 
jurisdictional provision). 
58  Directive 2014/65, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 
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exchanges.59 Specifically, MAR reaches any insider trading in financial 
instruments traded on European markets, even if the trades made on the 
basis of inside information do not occur on a European exchange (as, for 
instance, with dual listed stocks or with private transactions in listed 
shares).60 MAR explicitly states that it does not matter whether the actions 
or omissions concerning the financial instruments covered by the 
regulation take place inside or outside of the European Union.61 
Even more broadly, MAR also applies to transactions in financial 
instruments not traded on European exchanges when the prices or values 
of those instruments depends on or can affect the prices or values of 
financial instruments traded on European markets.62 This could pick up 
insider trading in American Depository Receipts (ADRs) or options for 
stocks traded on European markets even though the ADRs or options were 
traded in the United States. This could also pick up insider trading in 
stocks on U.S. exchanges if the companies issuing the stocks listed other 
securities, such as bonds, for trading in European markets.63 
 The end result is the potential for overlap between the jurisdictional 
reach of the U.S. and E.U. laws. While in private litigation this raises a 
choice-of-law issue in which the court must pick one law or the other, in 
government prosecutions—which are the predominant enforcement 
mechanism for insider trading64—either or both nations might prosecute 
under their law unless some doctrine prevents this. There are several 
possible doctrines to consider. 
 United States federal courts invoke a presumption against 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in part to avoid conflicts between 
U.S. and foreign laws.65 The explicit language of Dodd-Frank rebuts the 
 
O.J. (L 173) 349, Annex I, sec. C. 
59  This includes so-called regulated, as well as multilateral and organized, exchanges in the 
E.U. MAR, supra note 28, at art. 2(1)(a)-(c). 
60  Id. 
61  Id. at art. 2(4). 
62  Id. at 2(1)(d). 
63  This depends on whether the prices and values of stocks and bonds issued by the same 
company impact each other.  
64  E.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Comparing Insider Trading in the United States and in the 
European Union: History and Recent Developments 27 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper 
No. 257, 2014). 
65  E.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
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presumption for the U.S. prohibition, while the explicit language of MAR 
would do the same, even if the European Court of Justice (the high court 
for interpreting E.U. law) were to follow the presumption.66 
 By triggering jurisdiction based upon either conduct or effects within 
the United States, Dodd-Frank employs two generally accepted grounds 
under international law for a nation to apply its law.67 Insofar as MAR 
reaches trading outside Europe based upon its impact on the price or value 
of securities traded in Europe, MAR similarly can claim jurisdiction based 
upon effects. Ironically, European nations years ago argued that this sort 
of effects-based jurisdiction was inconsistent with international law.68 
MAR shows that the Europeans have moved past this view, and, since the 
U.S. has long used jurisdiction based upon economic effects within the 
nation,69 the U.S. is hardly in a position to complain. Still, while effects-
based jurisdiction allows MAR to reach trades outside Europe that impact 
securities prices in Europe, MAR also seeks to ban insider trading outside 
Europe in financial instruments whose prices depend on prices in Europe. 
This appears to go beyond the generally accepted grounds under 
international law for nations to apply their law.70 Tut tut. 
  Finally, some U.S. courts have considered comity, among other 
concerns, in order to dismiss suits brought under U.S. laws in situations in 
which the challenged conduct was legal where it occurred.71 Of course, 
prosecutors also might use their discretion not to prosecute in such 
situations. Even if the European Court of Justice recognizes comity, 
however, it is difficult to invoke the doctrine in the face of MAR’s explicit 
language regarding the prohibition’s scope.  
 
66  See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.  European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101–02 (2016) 
(presumption against extraterritoriality can be rebutted by language or context that shows Congress 
intended the statute to apply outside the United States). 
67  E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1986). 
68  E.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 1, 32-33 (1993) (discussing European objections to the application of U.S. antitrust law 
based upon the economic effects in the United States of conduct outside the United States). 
69  E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (applying the 
Sherman Act to a cartel limiting production outside the United States based upon the impact of 
increasing prices inside the United States). 
70  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
402 (listing accepted bases under international law for claiming jurisdiction to apply a nation’s law). 
71  See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 n.31 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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IV. NORMATIVE LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 While much of the normative debate over the insider trading 
prohibition asks whether there should be any prohibition at all,72 the clash 
between the U.S. and E.U. approaches takes the prohibition as a given and 
asks where to draw the line regarding whom the prohibition reaches. Even 
resolving this narrower issue, however, still depends upon one’s view of 
the purpose for the prohibition. 
 
A. Market Effects 
 
 Normative arguments about insider trading often focus on market 
effects. Proponents of a ban argue that insider trading deters investors and 
raises the cost of capital for companies.73 Opponents of a ban, or of a 
broad ban, commonly argue that preventing persons from acting upon 
information relevant to the value of securities leads to less accurate 
securities prices.74 Indeed, a primary argument made by critics of the 
broad reach of the E.U. prohibition is that it will deter parties from 
investigating companies by depriving researchers of rewards for their 
efforts.75 This mirrors the Supreme Court’s express concern in Dirks that 
an equal access rule deters legitimate efforts of stock analysts to ferret out 
important information.76 
 The E.U.’s adoption of a broad prohibition seemingly provides a 
testing ground for this concern. Any negative impacts on the efficient 
pricing of securities on European markets have not been sufficiently 
visible in the years since MAD to provide support for the concerns of 
 
72  E.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
73  E.g., Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic 
Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115–18 (1985). 
74  E.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 35 (2006). 
75  E.g., Sergio Gilotta, The Regulation of Outsider Trading in EU and the US, 13 EUR. 
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 631, 664 (2016); Richard A. Booth, Insider Trading: There Oughta be a 
Law — Or Not, 38 REG. 18, 21 (2015). 
76  463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983). 
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critics.77 Searching for less readily visible impacts would be an interesting 
project for empirical research employing statistical methods. About all one 
can conclude at this point is that the European experience does not support 
overly dire predictions regarding the consequences of an equal access rule.  
 
B. Fairness 
 
 Unfashionable as such fuzzy thinking might be, the prohibition on 
insider trading may rest more upon a sense of what is unfair than upon 
market effects. Fairness, however, is often in the eye of the beholder. 
Hence, the reason for presenting the cases in Part II of this essay is not 
simply to demonstrate the difference between the results under U.S. versus 
E.U. law through real examples, but also to provide a real world context 
for asking what is fair. 
 Perhaps I have been reading too much recently about income 
inequality and the growing class division in the United States.78 What 
strikes me, however, as the common thread running through the cases in 
Part II is the division between in-group haves and out-group have-nots. 
Large shareholders, and individuals working in finance who are members 
of professional and social networks, obtained information as a result of 
contacts not available to ordinary traders. The result is a systematic 
transfer of wealth from the unconnected in the ordinary middle class to the 
rich and to those in the financial industry.79 In short, the trading in these 
cases presents a microcosm seemingly validating complaints that a rigged 
system has produced growing income inequality in the United States, the 
consequences of which we saw in the 2016 election. 
 
77  See Gilotta, supra note 75 (not citing any empirical evidence of a negative impact of MAD or 
MAR on the efficiency of pricing on securities markets in Europe); Booth, supra note 75 (same). To 
be honest, there is no readily visible evidence of positive impacts on European securities markets 
either. 
78  See, e.g., RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE 
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2017); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press 2014). 
79  See, e.g.,ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 52–53 
(2016). 
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 Of course, one may object that of all the advantages possessed by 
those with greater wealth or working in finance,80 insider trading may have 
the least impact in producing income inequality. Still, there is a difference 
between insider trading and the sorts of networking advantages that often 
open doors to interviews, education, jobs and business opportunities. 
Trading on inside information simply produces a zero sum wealth transfer 
from those without the information to those who have it. By contrast, 
access to educational, employment or business opportunities presumably 
still requires the recipient of the opportunity to perform.81 
Viewed in this light, the difference between the U.S. and E.U. insider 
trading prohibitions is simply one manifestation of a broader difference 
between current U.S. and European laws and cultural attitudes concerning 
income inequality. For example, levels of executive compensation in the 
United States versus Europe, as well as the application of corporate law to 
challenges to executive compensation, also illustrate this difference.82 The 
irony is that when I was growing up, the stereotype of Europe was of 
economically divided societies and the image of the United States was of a 
middle class nation. 
 
C. Line Drawing 
 
 Not even the Europeans outlaw every trade in which one party knows 
more than the other. Article 9 of MAR excludes a person’s knowledge of 
the person’s own intention to purchase or sell securities from the definition 
of inside information.83 Also, Paragraph 28 of MAR’s preamble excludes 
research and estimates based upon publicly available data from being 
considered inside information. Essentially, MAD and MAR, like the 
Second Circuit’s pre-Chiarella rule, embody an equal access, not an equal 
information, rule. 
 
80  See, e.g., REEVES, supra note 78. 
81  One might question whether such broad societal fairness concerns justify harsh criminal 
penalties (prison). This essay simply addresses the scope of the prohibition, not the question of 
sanctions. 
82  E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 478-83 
(2007).  
83  See supra note 28, at art. 9.  
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 Critics have argued that the particular line MAD and MAR draw 
between inside and not inside information—or at least ambiguity about 
this line84—might deter desirable use of information.85 No doubt any line 
can be over- or under-inclusive and can raise issues in its application. Still, 
it helps to start with the right questions. The question of whether 
information consists of research and estimates based upon publicly 
available data gets at the heart of fairness and efficiency concerns insofar 
as it seeks to reward legitimate efforts. Fiduciary duty—the ostensible 
linchpin of the U.S. approach—is simply the product of the historical need 
to fit the prohibition of insider trading into a rubric built around the word 
“fraud.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In Chiarella, the U.S. Supreme Court took one fork in the road; in 
MAD and MAR the European Union took the other. One fork leads in a 
small way toward a more just and fair society. 
 
 
84  Specifically, there can be room for dispute over what is publicly available data. 
85  Gilotta, supra note 75 at 22. Also see author’s text accompanying notes 54–92 in his article. 
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